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I. INTRODUCTION
Before it was uncovered and prosecuted, the international
vitamin cartel, known as "Vitamins, Inc." by its perpetrators,
was extraordinarily successful. Estimates of cartel profits
run as high as $18 billion (in 2003 dollars).' In addition to
substantial criminal sanctions, cartel members paid over $2
billion to American plaintiffs.2 When foreign plaintiffs tried
to sue the foreign defendants in American courts, however,
they encountered resistance.' A trial court read the Foreign
Trade Antitrust Improvements Act ("FTAIA")4 to restrict the
* Jerome L. Greene Professor of Transactional Law at Columbia
University School of Law. I would like to thank Benjamin Brickner for his
assistance.
1 Brief for Certain Professors of Economics as Amici Curiae in Support
of Respondents at 10, F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542
U.S. 155 (2004) (No. 03-724) [hereinafter Economists' Brief], 2004 WL
533930. For the story of the vitamin cartel, see David Barboza, Tearing
Down The Facade of 'Vitamins Inc.', N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1999, at C1.
2 Amici for the defendants reckoned the total financial antitrust fines
and penalties imposed on the cartel were between $4.4 and $5.6 billion.
Brief Amici Curiae of Professors Darren Bush et al. in Support of
Respondents, at 15 n.5, Empagran, 542 U.S. 155 (No. 03-724), 2004 WL
533933.
3 Plaintiffs included five foreign vitamin distributors located in
Ukraine, Australia, Ecuador, and Panama. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 159.
4 Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96
Stat. 1233 (1982).
reach of the Sherman Act and preclude foreign purchasers
from suing the foreign defendants.5  The D.C. Circuit
reversed, holding that the facts brought the case within
FTAIA's exceptions.' There already being a circuit split,7 the
Supreme Court granted certiorari. In its unanimous
decision, the Court ruled that the FTAIA exception did not
apply where a claim rested solely on foreign harm that was
independent of any adverse domestic effect.'
The FTAIA excludes most anti-competitive foreign trade
and commercial activity from the Sherman Act's reach.
However, the Act carves out an exception to this general
rule, though the parameters of the exception are less than
clear:
[The Sherman Act] shall not apply to conduct
involving trade or commerce (other than import trade
or import commerce) with foreign nations unless-
(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and
reasonably foreseeable effect-
(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or
commerce with foreign nations, or on import
trade or import commerce with foreign
nations.., and
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the
provisions of [the Sherman Act] .9
Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche, Ltd., No. Civ. 001686
(TFH), 2001 WL 761360, at *4 (D.D.C. June 7, 2001).
' Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche, Ltd., 315 F.3d 338, 350
(D.C. Cir. 2003).
7 Compare Kruman v. Christie's Int'l, 284 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2002)
(holding that foreign plaintiffs could sue), with Den Norske Stats
Oljeselskap As v. HeereMac Vof, 241 F.3d 420 (5th Cir. 2001) (dismissing
foreign plaintiffs claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
' F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 159
(2004). Justice O'Connor did not participate; Justice Scalia filed a very
short concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined.
' Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96
Stat. 1246 (1982).
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Plaintiffs argued that their claim fell within that
exception, but the Court held otherwise. It remanded the
case for consideration of an alternative theory that plaintiffs
had proffered, but on which the D.C. Circuit had not ruled.
The Supreme Court thereby left future foreign plaintiffs with
some wiggle room, but little guidance. ° On remand, the D.C.
Circuit rejected this alternative theory." Subsequent
plaintiffs have fared similarly, with only one reported
decision of a suit (involving price fixing of computer
components) surviving a motion to dismiss. 2
In Empagran, the Court recognized that the cartel's
domestic price fixing could only be sustained if it operated
both domestically and abroad; nonetheless, it held that this
would be insufficient to allow foreign plaintiffs to sue foreign
sellers in the U.S. If not then, do any circumstances fall
within the FTAIA exception?
In this article, I identify one narrow class of cases that
would satisfy the statutory exception. I must emphasize the
modest scope of this inquiry. I am not suggesting that this is
a socially optimal policy, or, indeed, even a wise one. Instead
of focusing on the interrelatedness of the foreign and
domestic prices, the inquiry centers on the resale of goods to
the domestic market. The argument, hinted at by Justice
Scalia at oral argument, is a variant on Illinois Brick Co. v.
Illinois, the Supreme Court's landmark ruling rejecting a
passing-on theory of injury suffered by indirect purchasers.
Before developing this argument in Section III, I first briefly
detail the Empagran decisions.
II. EMPAGRAN AND THE FTAIA
During the Empagran litigation, it was undisputed that
the domestic and foreign vitamin markets were
10 Empagran, 542 U.S. at 175.
Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche, Ltd., 417 F.3d 1267 (D.C.
Cir. 2005).
12 Sun Microsystems Inc. v. Hynix Semiconductor Inc., 534 F. Supp.
2d 1101 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
13 Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
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interrelated.1" Vitamins, Inc. could neither operate solely
within the U.S. while leaving foreign markets competitive,
nor cartelize foreign markets alone. 5 Transportation costs
were minimal, trade barriers were low, and vitamins were
fungible. Had the conspiracy been confined to a single
geographic submarket, it would have been doomed by
arbitrage. The plaintiffs argued, and the D.C. Circuit on its
initial hearing of the case agreed, that this interrelationship
was sufficient to bring the cartel within the FTAIA
exception.' 6  The conspiracy itself had (1) "a direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" on domestic
competition, and (2) this effect (injury to the domestic
customer) "[gave] rise to" a Sherman Act claim. 7
Although the Supreme Court accepted the inter-
relationship argument, its framing of the issue made clear
that this was insufficient to find an FTAIA exception:
The price fixing conduct significantly and adversely
affects both customers outside the United States and
customers within the United States, but the adverse
foreign effect is independent of any adverse domestic
effect. In these circumstances, we find that the
14 At oral argument, plaintiffs counsel asserted:
"Now, the reason our position is critical is the one
identified by Justice Kennedy, and that is that the
conspirators' cartel encompassed a worldwide market for
bulk vitamins and the worldwide market is relevant
because geographic boundaries don't have any meaning
here. A conspiracy limited to U.S. commerce would have
collapsed as U.S. purchasers bought abroad, as Justice
Scalia has said."
Transcript of Oral Argument at 19, F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v.
Empagran S.A, 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (No. 03-724), 2004 WL 1047902, 41
U.S.L.W. 3686.
'" Like love and marriage or a horse and carriage, you can't have one
without the other. See SAMMY CAHN AND JIMMY VAN HEUSEN, LovE AND
MARRIAGE (1958).
"6 Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche, Ltd., 315 F.3d 338, 340
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1) (2006)).
17 Id.
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FTAIA exception does not apply (and thus the
Sherman Act does not apply)."8
The Court's primary justification for this conclusion was
prescriptive comity, a rule of construction that "cautions
courts to assume that legislators take account of the
legitimate sovereign interests of other nations when they
write American laws."19 Thus, American law should not be
read to supplant the laws of Canada, Japan, or other
sovereign states when these nations are better able to
determine the appropriate level of protection for their
domestic customers from anticompetitive conduct.2 ° When
the plaintiffs argued that there could be no conflict of law
because all governments agreed that naked price fixing was
bad, the Court was not persuaded: "[S]everal foreign nations
have filed briefs here arguing that to apply our remedies
would unjustifiably permit their citizens to bypass their own
less generous remedial schemes, thereby upsetting a balance
of competing considerations that their own domestic
antitrust laws embody.
21
s Empagran, 542 U.S. at 164 (emphasis added).
19 Id. at 164-65. The majority's second argument was based on its
understanding of the legislative history of the FTAIA. Id. at 162-63.
20 Id. at 165. Amicus Briefs were filed on behalf of the defendants by
seven foreign governments: Germany, Belgium, Canada, Japan, the
United Kingdom, Ireland and the Netherlands. Brief of the Governments
of the Federal Republic of Germany and Belgium as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioners, Empagran, 524 U.S. 155 (No. 03-724), 2004 WL
226388 [hereinafter Germany and Belgium Brief]; Brief for the
Government of Canada as Amicus Curiae Supporting Reversal,
Empagran, 524 U.S. 155 (No. 03-724), 2004 WL 226389 [hereinafter
Canada Brief]; Brief of the Government of Japan as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioners, Empagran, 524 U.S. 155 (No. 03-724), 2004 WL
226390 [hereinafter Japan Brief]; Brief of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, Ireland and the Kingdom of the
Netherlands as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Empagran, 524
U.S. 155 (No. 03-724), 2004 WL 226597 [hereinafter United Kingdom and
Netherlands Brief].
21 Empagran, 542 U.S. at 167. These nations' remedies varied widely,
with American treble damages plus attorney fees falling near the top of
the remedial scale. See e.g., Germany and Belgium Brief, supra note 20;
Canada Brief, supra note 20; Japan Brief, supra note 20.
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Plaintiffs enlisted a gaggle of economists to argue that
allowing only domestic victims to file suit against an
international cartel with a worldwide market would result in
under-deterrence. Defendants did not address this
argument directly; instead defendants emphasized that the
deterrence mix is multifaceted because it includes American
private treble-damages suits, American criminal
prosecutions, and foreign enforcement actions.23  The
defendants and several amici argued, somewhat counter-
intuitively, that increasing potential liability by permitting
foreign plaintiffs to sue could actually reduce deterrence."
Because an important element of the Department of Justice's
antitrust detection strategy is amnesty, a cartel member
could see a reduction or elimination of its public penalty in
return for cooperating with law enforcement officials.25 The
benefits of cooperation, however, are diluted as exposure to
private damages increases. Broadening civil exposure to
22 See e.g., Economists' Brief, supra note 1; Brief of Amici Curiae
Economists Joseph E. Stiglitz and Peter R. Orszag in Support of
Respondents, Empagran, 524 U.S. 155 (No. 03-724), 2004 WL 533934;
Brief Amici Curiae of Professors Darren Bush et al. in Support of
Respondents, Empagran, 524 U.S. 155 (No. 03-724), 2004 WL 533933.
2' Empagran, 542 U.S. at 167-74. If under-deterrence were indeed a
concern, Congress could address this without permitting foreign claims by
boosting penalties in the two domestic categories.
24 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 17, Empagran, 542 U.S. 155 (No. 03-724), 2004 WL 234125;
United Kingdom Brief, supra note 20, at 9-14.
2 At oral argument, R. Hewitt Pate, Asst. Att'y Gen., as amicus curae
in support of petitioners testified that,
[gliven the key role of deterrence, both in the opinion below
and in the respondents' arguments here, the United States
thinks it important to offer the Court an accurate under-
standing of how international cartel enforcement really
works. It's only in the past 8 years that we've begun to see
dramatic success in detecting and punishing international
cartels, and that has come about only by international co-
operation with other enforcement agencies and through the
use of amnesty programs.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, Empagran, 542 U.S. 155 (No. 03-724),
2004 WL 1047902.
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include foreign plaintiffs, the defendants argued, would
undermine the amnesty program and weaken deterrence.
The Court acknowledged the disagreement, but declined to
choose sides.26
Not surprisingly, nations disagree as to the appropriate
level of deterrence for anticompetitive activities. For
international cartels, no country can determine the level of
deterrence unilaterally; the policies of one nation will affect
the policies of others. Even if we knew the optimal level of
deterrence, the U.S. could not achieve that level without
coordination with the rest of the world. As the Court
observed:
No one denies that America's antitrust laws, when
applied to foreign conduct, can interfere with a for-
eign nation's ability independently to regulate its
own commercial affairs. But our courts have long
held that application of our antitrust laws to foreign
anticompetitive conduct is nonetheless reasonable,
and hence consistent with principles of prescriptive
comity, insofar as they reflect a legislative effort to
redress domestic antitrust injury that foreign anti-
competitive conduct has caused."
26 [R]espondents point to policy considerations, namely, that
application of the Sherman Act in present circumstances
will (through increased deterrence) help protect Americans
against foreign-caused anticompetitive injury. Petitioners,
however, have made important experience-backed argu-
ments (based upon amnesty-seeking incentives) to the con-
trary. We cannot say whether, on balance, respondents'
side of this empirically based argument or the enforcement
agencies' side is correct.
Empagran, 542 U.S. at 174. Congress recently enacted legislation limiting
the damage remedy to single damages for those granted amnesty.
Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act, Pub. L. No.
108-237, 118 Stat. 665 (2004). The European Commission has also
recommended limiting damages for firms applying for leniency. Comm'n
of the European Communities, White Paper on Damages for Breach of the
EC Antitrust Rules (2008).
27 Empagran, 542 U.S. at 165.
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The Court concluded, it would not be "reasonable to apply
those laws to foreign conduct insofar as that conduct causes
independent foreign harm and that foreign harm alone gives
rise to the plaintiff's claim."2" When the adverse foreign
effect is "independent of any adverse domestic effect," the
FTAIA would bar the plaintiffs.29 Although the Court in
Empagran determined that the foreign effect of Vitamins,
Inc. was independent of its domestic effect, removing the
plaintiffs' claim from FTAIA's limited exception (and thus
from the Sherman Act as well), a ray of hope remained for
the plaintiffs. On appeal before the D.C. Circuit, the
plaintiffs had presented two theories of their case, only one
of which the Court of Appeals had addressed." For this
reason, the Supreme Court remanded so that the plaintiffs
could present their alternative theory:
Respondents contend that, because vitamins are fun-
gible and readily transportable, without an adverse
domestic effect (i.e., higher prices in the United
States), the sellers could not have maintained their
international price-fixing arrangement and respon-
dents would not have suffered their foreign injury.
They add that this "but for" condition is sufficient to
bring the price-fixing conduct within the scope of the
FTAIA's exception.3
Instead of simply stating that for the cartel to succeed,
prices would have to be fixed in both the foreign and
domestic markets, plaintiffs argued that high domestic
prices caused foreign prices to be high, thereby causing
antitrust injury. On remand, the Court of Appeals rejected
this argument, concluding that "but for" causation was
28 Id.
29 Id. at 164.
30 Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche, Ltd., 315 F.3d 338, 341
(D.C. Cir. 2003) ("In light of our disposition in favor of appellant on other
grounds, we find it unnecessary to address this 'alternative' theory of
subject matter jurisdiction.").
31 Empagran, 542 U.S. at 175.
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insufficient. 2 The domestic injury needed to be a proximate
cause of the foreign plaintiffs' injury: "The statutory
language-'gives rise to'-indicates a direct causal
relationship, that is, proximate causation, and is not
satisfied by the mere but-for 'nexus.' ""
The strained causality argument was a response to the
Supreme Court's rejection of the notion that the interrelation
of the foreign and domestic markets would be enough for the
plaintiffs to prevail. 4 The "but for" versus "proximate" cause
characterization doesn't really help. As Judge Noonan
observed in a concurring opinion post-Empagran, "[w]e reach
this ... point not from guidance in words like 'proximate' or
'direct' but from a strong sense that the protection of
consumers in another country is normally the business of
that country. Location, not logic, keeps [Plaintiffs'] claim out
of court."35
The simple economic point is that for the Vitamins, Inc.
conspirators to maintain a cartel price anywhere, they had to
maintain it everywhere. Domestic price fixing, without more,
would not cause foreign injuries; likewise, foreign price
fixing, without more, would not cause domestic injuries. The
Empagran plaintiffs sought to argue that domestic price
fixing had a substantial effect on domestic competition
(true); gave rise to an antitrust claim (also true); was not
sustainable without prices being fixed in the foreign markets
(also true); and therefore the foreign plaintiffs could sue.
On remand, the Court of Appeals found that the
causation was indirect. "It was the foreign effects of price-
fixing outside of the United States that directly caused, or
'g[alve rise to,' their losses when they purchased vitamins
32 Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche, Ltd., 417 F.3d 1267, 1270
(D.C. Cir. 2005).
31 Id. at 1271.
3" Plaintiffs felt precluded from making a more natural causation
argument: high foreign prices caused, or at least enabled, domestic prices
to be high.
" In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig.,
546 F.3d 981, 991 (9th Cir. 2008) (Noonan, J., concurring).
No. 3:785]
abroad at super-competitive prices."36 Therefore, the court
concluded, the plaintiffs "[did] not establish.., that the U.S.
effects of the appellees' conduct-i.e., increased prices in the
United States-proximately caused the foreign appellants'
injuries."37
III. WHAT'S ILLINOIS BRICK GOT TO DO WITH IT?
Under federal law, if cartel member X sells to Y, who then
resells to Z, the direct purchaser (Y) can sue under the
Sherman Act, but the indirect purchaser (Z) cannot. So
decided the Supreme Court in Hanover Shoe3" and Illinois
Brick. 9  The direct purchaser can sue for the entire
overcharge, regardless of whether it "passed on" any or all of
it (Hanover Shoe)4" and the indirect purchaser cannot sue
(Illinois Brick). 1 A majority of states have adopted Illinois
Brick repealers that permit suits by indirect purchasers. 2
At the federal level, there has been some movement to
overrule Illinois Brick."3 Given the inherent difficulty of
determining the incidence of an overcharge, I think the
federal bar against indirect purchasers' suits is appropriate.
In any event, the Illinois Brick rule was in place when
Empagran was decided and remains the law.
36 Empagran, 417 F.3d at 1271.
37 Id.
3' Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
31 Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
40 Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 494.
4' Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 720.
42 "At the present, more than thirty-five states permit indirect, as well
as direct, purchasers to sue for damages under state law." ANTITRUST
MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 269 (2007),
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report-recommendation/amc_fin
al-report.pdf.
' Id. at 266. For criticism of the recommendation, see William H.
Page, Class Interpleader: The Antitrust Modernization Commission's
Recommendation to Overrule Illinois Brick Manuscript, June 17, 2008,
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1147200.
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During oral argument in Empagran, Justice Scalia raised
Illinois Brick.4 In his questioning of respondent's counsel,
he added a geographic component to the X-Y-Z
hypothetical.45 The foreign cartel member (X) sold to a
domestic firm (Y) which then resold to a foreign plaintiff (Z):
I would think your defense against that is ... not to
assert that there's no effect on... foreign commerce,
on our exports, because . . . I think there is .... I
would think your defense is ... in Section 2 of the
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, which
requires that this effect on commerce, on export
commerce, gives rise to a claim under the provisions
of Sections 1 to 7, and ... the only way it gives rise to
a claim on the part of these people is a claim as sec-
ond purchasers, and Illinois Brick would have ex-
cluded their claim, I assume, if they are re-buying
... from people in the United States. Wouldn't that
be the case?46
He raised Illinois Brick again when questioning one of the
plaintiffs variations on the arbitrage/one market theme.
Plaintiff argued that if there had not been price fixing in the
United States, the foreign buyers would have purchased
from the Americans at a lower price.4" Since the American
price fixing made that lower price unavailable, plaintiff
argued, they were forced to pay a high foreign price. Justice
Scalia responded:
[Ilt seems extraordinary to me that if... a foreign
company had been injured by buying drugs from an
American company that bought them from the con-
spirators at an excessively high price, that foreign
company would not have a cause of action. But
you're saying that a foreign company has a cause of
4 Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v.
Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (No. 03-724), 2004 WL 1047902, 41
U.S.L.W. 3686.
45 id.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 35.
41 Id. at 35-6.
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action by reason of the fact that had the American
company not purchased at the artificially high con-
spiratorial price, but at a lower price, they might
have purchased. .. from that intermediate person
.... [W]hereas Illinois Brick would clearly bar the
first suit, you're saying it doesn't bar the second suit
as a rationale for allowing them to sue here, and that
strikes me as very strange.49
To rephrase his characterization of plaintiffs argument, if
X (foreign producer) sold to Y (American) who resold to Z
(foreign), Z loses under Illinois Brick; but if Z bought directly
from X and merely complained about Y's price, then Z would
be able to sue.
Neither the Supreme Court nor the Court of Appeals on
remand followed up on Justice Scalia's invocation of Illinois
Brick, which is mentioned in neither decision. Nonetheless, I
believe that it is the key to finding at least one class of cases
that would fall within the exception. To be clear, it is not
that Illinois Brick provides the rationale; rather its role as a
bar to certain domestic claimants is what matters. The
FTAIA exception fills a void left by Illinois Brick when the
direct purchaser is a foreign entity.
Consider another variation on the X-Y-Z hypothetical in
which the locations of Y and Z in the Scalia hypothetical are
reversed. A foreign conspirator (X) sells vitamins to a
distributor (Y), who then sells those same vitamins to a
domestic customer (Z). As before, Illinois Brick would
preclude a suit by the indirect purchaser (Z). Would Y, the
direct purchaser, have a claim? If Y were a domestic firm,
Illinois Brick would clearly allow the suit. But what if Y
were a foreign firm? There are three possibilities: (1) bar the
foreign suit so that X is liable to neither Y nor Z; (2)
maintain the foreign bar while carving an exception to
Illinois Brick that allows Z to sue whenever the direct
purchaser is barred from doing so (in general or specifically
when the direct purchaser is a foreign entity); or (3) keep
Illinois Brick intact and allow Y to sue. The last option is a
49 Id. at 35.
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natural reading of the FTAIA exception: the effect on
domestic commerce (Z) is direct and reasonably foreseeable
(more on "substantial" below) and the effect itself (an
elevated domestic price) gives rise to a Sherman Act claim.
Suppose we add another step to the X-Y-Z hypothetical.
Instead of selling vitamins directly to U.S. customers, the
foreign direct purchaser (Y) adds the vitamins to pig feed
and ultimately exports the pork to the United States."
Suppose further that the price of vitamins is an insignificant
contributor to the cost of pork and that the exported quantity
is too small to influence the American pork market. Thus,
the impact of the overcharged vitamins would be confined to
the economic rents of foreign producers. Could Y sue to
recover the overcharge? It seems clear that this claim would
falter before both clauses of the FTAIA exception. The
conspiratorial overcharging might have a direct effect on
some markets, but the effect on domestic markets would
remain insubstantial (Clause 1)." 1  Since domestic pork
prices would not be affected, the overcharge would not give
rise to a Sherman Act claim (Clause 2).52 There are
intermediate cases. Suppose instead that Y repackaged the
vitamins and that the value added was ten percent; that
might be able to pass the substantiality test. Where
precisely the line should be drawn is something that courts
would have to work out.
The FTAIA's concern with "substantial" effects modifies
the Illinois Brick rule when the direct purchaser is a foreign
firm. If the direct purchaser were a domestic firm, the
ultimate effect on final users would be irrelevant. Under
Hanover Shoe, even if there were no impact on final users, a
domestic direct purchaser could recover the entire
overcharge (trebled). If the direct purchaser were foreign,
however, liability would turn on both the likelihood that the
0 One of the Empagran plaintiffs was the Winddridge Pig Farm of
Australia. Id. at 7.
" See Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 4013(a)(1) (2006).
" See id. at 4013(b).
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overcharge would be passed on to domestic customers and its
magnitude.
One might argue that only the portion of the overcharge
passed on to domestic customers should be included in a
damages award, but this would recreate the very obstacles
Illinois Brick allowed us to avoid. I propose a new
interpretation of the FTAIA exception consistent with the
Supreme Court's opinion that incorporates a concern for
international comity while eliminating the inherent
difficulty of determining the incidence of an overcharge.
This approach entails a two-step process in which liability is
determined before damages are calculated. The "passing on"
question arises only at the first stage, determining liability:
was it likely that there would be a discernible effect on the
domestic market (substantiality)? Only a claim passing this
hurdle would proceed to the damages stage. Here, the
foreign direct purchaser, like its domestic counterpart, would
recover the full overcharge, but only on goods actually sold
into the United States. If, for example, the foreign direct
purchaser resold twenty percent of its purchased vitamins to
the United States, it could recover the overcharge on those
goods. The overcharge on the remaining 80 percent would
not provide the basis for recovery since the effect on domestic
commerce by the sale of those goods would be indirect and
therefore barred.
This narrow exception is consistent with the FTAIA and
the Supreme Court's interest in international comity.
Foreign entities can sue only if the effect on the domestic
price was direct and substantial-that is, only if a significant
portion of the price increase was passed on to the domestic
customers. For the most part, the interests of the foreign
countries in maintaining their own remedy structures would
be honored. Liability would be limited to the case in which
the foreign sale resulted directly in a higher price to the
eventual domestic customer.
This interpretation would not have benefited the
Empagran plaintiffs, since it is doubtful that any of the
vitamins they purchased would have ended up in the United
States. The exception is a very narrow one. To illustrate the
[Vol. 2009
THE EMPAGRAN EXCEPTION
limited nature of the exception I propose, consider Den
Norske, one of the two opinions causing the pre-Empagran
circuit split. 3 The Supreme Court's decision in Empagran
ratified the rejection of Den Norske's claim, though for
reasons unrelated to the approach suggested here. Den
Norske, a Norwegian oil firm, sued providers of heavy-lift
barge services who had conspired to suppress and eliminate
competition by rigging bids and allocating customers and
territories. There were only six or seven such barges in the
world, and there was no question that there was a global
market. As in Empagran, the court recognized that the price
paid by the foreign plaintiff was inflated, but that fact alone
would not give rise to liability. 4
The plaintiffs argued that the barges were an input in
their production of offshore oil and that they sold a
considerable amount of oil to the United States (roughly
400,000 barrels per day). The conspiracy, they claimed,
"compelled Americans to pay supra-competitive prices for
oil."55 Under the approach suggested here, the first stage of
the inquiry asks whether the overcharge for Norwegian
barge services substantially impacted U.S. oil prices. If so,
the second stage would determine damages based on the
overcharge for barge services, not for the amount passed on
to American consumers by inflated domestic oil prices.
Further, the overcharge would be assessed not for all the
barge services, but only for that fraction equal to the portion
of the oil sold by the plaintiff into the United States. In Den
Norske, the numerator would be 400,000 barrels per day (the
decision does not provide information on the denominator). 6
Would Den Norske's claim survive the first step? Almost
certainly not. Norwegian oil production forms but a sliver of
the international oil market. Any increase in the cost of
producing Norwegian oil is unlikely to have any impact on
international oil prices generally and, therefore, U.S.
" Den Norske Stats Olieselskap As v. HeereMac Vof, 241 F.3d 420
(5th Cir. 2001).
14 Id. at 426-28.
" Id. at 426.
56 Id. at 422.
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domestic prices in particular. The effect would instead fall
entirely on Norwegian economic rents. Thus, a court should
hold that the claim fails to clear the first hurdle. A domestic
purchaser of barge services, however, would be able to
recover for the full overcharge, even though the price of oil
was unaffected by the conspiracy.
Under the suggested approach, Den Norske's claim would
be dismissed from a U.S. court for want of a substantial
effect on domestic commerce or trade. If, on the other hand,
the conspiracy had a substantial effect, then damages would
be proportional to Den Norske's sales into the United States.
In either case, Den Norske would have recourse against the
conspiratorial barge companies in Norwegian (or other
foreign) courts for the impact on non-U.S. markets.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
There are a number of markets like the vitamin market
in which domestic and international markets are tightly
linked by arbitrage. An international cartel could not
successfully fix prices in the domestic market without also
fixing prices in the foreign market, and vice versa. That is
the simple truth that formed the basis of the plaintiffs'
claims in Empagran. In their interpretation of the FTAIA,
the Supreme Court and the D.C. Court of Appeals
acknowledged that truth, but concluded that it did not bring
the plaintiffs within the FTAIA exception.
Building on arguments raised by Justice Scalia at oral
argument, I have offered a simple-and very narrow-
interpretation of the FTAIA exception. It fills the gap
created by Illinois Brick when the direct purchaser is a
foreign entity and the domestic indirect purchasers face
elevated prices. Domestic effects do not bring about foreign
injury, as plaintiffs argue. Rather, domestic effects arise
only if a substantial portion of the overcharge to foreign
firms is passed on to their domestic customers. It should be
clear that the foreign defendant's exposure would be much
less under this interpretation compared to the potential
liability under the one market/arbitrage theories proposed by
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the Empagran plaintiffs. With this interpretation, most
foreign claims against foreigners would be barred.
The FTAIA, under this interpretation, provides some
possibility of relief while respecting a concern for
international comity. It would limit the foreign direct
purchaser's claims to those that have a substantial effect on
the domestic market-that is, where a substantial portion of
the overcharge is passed on to the domestic market. If the
foreign purchaser bore most of the overcharge, its claim
would properly fall within the scope of foreign governments'
competition policy, not that of the United States. If, on the
other hand, the foreign purchaser resold a substantial
portion of the overpriced goods to the domestic marketplace,
causing a direct effect on domestic trade, the purchaser
ought to have recourse in an American court.
